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From 1983 to 1996, the Australian trade union movement led an integrated industrial
relations reform agenda aimed at restructuring work organisation, the training system
and union structures.  These reforms are the basis for the claim that Australia has
deliberately, successfully and permanently avoided a Thatcher-Reagan route to
seeking international competitiveness, in favour of a more consensual, inclusive,
social democratic approach.
The present paper uses an institutionalist, supply-side framework of industrial
restructuring, drawing on the work of Wolfgang Streeck to describe and assess the
Australian reforms.  Five institutional conditions for diversified quality production are
identified, each of which has been tackled to some extent in Australia.  Technological
change at work is now open to union influence; employment protection has been
increased; work organisation and skill formation have been central elements in
industrial relations reform; and most union members have been reorganised into
twenty large unions.  Moreover, the union agenda has been avowedly inclusive and
egalitarian.
Unfortunately, this 'skill oriented' strategy has not yielded the benefits promised.
Economic performance has been average, union density has fallen, and many
institutional supports for union membership and bargaining activity are under threat.
Union misjudgements, employer and government resistance, and an unfavourable
institutional legacy in industrial relations (in particular, the weakness of workplace
bargaining structures), are reasons for the disappointing outcomes.
Morevoer, the union supply side reform agenda needs to be placed in its proper
context.  Without complementary government policies affecting aggregate demand,
industry and finance reform, supply side intervention can have only a limited impact.
Unions are not strong enough to force through industrial restructuring alone.
However, faced with limited alternatives, the supply side approach is still the best on
offer for unions.
Zusammenfassung
In den Jahren von 1983 bis 1996 verfolgte die australische Gewerkschaftsbewegung
einen abgestimmten Kurs der Reform der industriellen Beziehungen, der auf die
Restrukturierung der Arbeitsorganisation, des Ausbildungssystems und der Struktur
der Gewerkschaften zielte.  Auf diesen Reformen basiert der Anspruch, daß
Australien bei der Suche nachinternationaler Wettbewerbsfähigkeit freiwillig, erfolgreich und dauerhaft einen Weg à
la Thatcher und Reagan vermieden hat zugunsten eines eher auf Konsens und
Mitsprache zielenden, sozialdemokratischen Ansatzes.
In dem Papier wird bei der Beschreibung und Bewertung der australischen
Reformen  ein institutionalistischer, angebotsorientierter Theorie-Rahmen verwendet,
der sich auf Arbeiten von Wolfgang Streeck stützt. Es werden fünf institutionelle
Bedingungen für eine diversifizierte Qualitätsproduktion herausgearbeitet, die alle bis
zu einem gewissen Grad Gegenstand des genannten Reformprozesses waren, d.h.
der technologische Wandel am Arbeitsplatz ist jetzt zugänglich für
gewerkschaftlichen Einfluß und der Beschäftigungsschutz wurde gestärkt. Die
Arbeitsorganisation und die Qualifizierung waren zentrale Bestandteile der Reform
der industriellen Beziehungen. Die meisten Gewerkschaftsmitglieder wurden in
zwanzig großen Gewerkschaften zusammengefaßt. Darüberhinaus sind die
Mitglieder ausdrücklich in die Entscheidungen über Themen der gewerkschaftlichen
Arbeit gleichberechtigt einbezogen.
Bedauerlicherweise hat diese „qualifizierungsorientierte“ Strategie bis jetzt noch
nicht zu den angestrebten Ergebnissen geführt. Die gesamtwirtschaftliche Leistung
blieb  mittelmäßig, die Präsenz der Gewerkschaften in den Unternehmen ist
zurückgegangen  und viele gewerkschaftliche Hilfen im Rahmen der Mitgliedschaft
und bei (Tarif-)Auseinandersetzungen mit den Unternehmern stehen „auf der Kippe“.
Fehleinschätzungen durch die Gewerkschaften, Widerstände der Arbeitgeber
und der Regierung und eine die industriellen Beziehungen erschwerende
Hinterlassenschaft institutioneller Regelungen (vor allem nur schwach ausgebildete
Strukturen für  Verhandlungen und Auseinandersetzungen vor Ort in den
Unternehmen) sind Gründe für die enttäuschenden Resultate.
Das auf die Angebotsseite ausgerichtete Programm der Gewerkschaften muß in
den  passenden Zusammenhang gerückt werden. Ohne komplementäre politische
Entscheidungen der Regierung, die auf die Gesamtnachfrage und eine Industrie-
sowie  Finanzreform zielen, kann eine  angebotsorientierte Reform nur eine
begrenzte Wirkung entfalten. Gewerkschaften allein sind zu schwach, um einen
Strukturwandel zu gestalten.Trotzdem: Angesichts weniger Alternativen ist der
angebotsorientierte Ansatz das Beste, was für die Gewerkschaften „im Angebot“ ist.Table of Contents
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The post-prime ministerial Paul Keating was reflective but quietly assertive about
Labor's achievement in building a social democracy distinguished by a consensual
social wage, a focus on education and training, a productivity culture and low inflation:
"I don't think there's any other country like us, that's got something quite like this."  ...
... "They could not win on a Thatcher or a Reagan model here," Mr Keating said.
"That's a mighty benefit for those who believe in equity and efficiency."
"And it's a step in our national progress. It marks us out. We put a value on people.
It's marking us out among Western democracies.'' (Australian Financial Review, 3
May 1996)
In national elections held in March 1996, the Australian Labor Party was swept
from office after 13 years in power.  The scale of the defeat, and subsequent
policy pronouncements by the new (conservative) Liberal-National Party
Coalition government, seriously threaten the claim made by the outgoing Prime
Minister that Australia has deliberately, successfully and permanently avoided a
Thatcher-Reagan route to seeking international competitiveness in favour of a
more consensual, inclusive, social democratic approach.  This claim is more
than just political self-justification - it finds support within the trade union
movement, from a number of international observers, and in the academic
literature as well.
1
A 'managed decentralisation' of the industrial relations system, led by the
trade union movement, has been a central element in the arguments for
Australian distinctiveness.  This process was unusual not only for its relatively
consensual character, but also for its accompanying supply-side reforms aimed
at establishing a progressive, high-wage, high-skill production route to
international competitiveness.  An integrated reform agenda aimed at
restructuring work organisation, skills formation and training was pursued,
reflecting the essentials of a 'skill-oriented' union strategy which has received
increasing attention in recent years (Mahnkopf, 1992; Rainbird, 1991).  In
addition, the union movement's own structures were subjected to major
change, aimed at shifting from a craft to an industry union basis.
                                                          
1 From a union perspective, see Belchamber (1994).  Of the many positive references to the
distinctive features of Australian industrial relations reform, see Archer (1992), Mathews
(1992a), Kyloh (1994), Locke et al. (1995).  The British Labour Party leader, Tony Blair,
visited Australia a number of times and commented favourably on the Labor Government;
there were also sympathetic editorials in The Guardian and New Statesman and Society
following the 1996 election defeat, emphasising the Labor Government's more socially
responsible reform agenda.  A number of Clinton administration officials have also visited
Australia to learn about its health and workplace reforms in particular.2
However, the unions' reward for this policy approach does not appear to be
commensurate with the benefits promised.  Apart from the loss of a supportive
government and associated political influence (which must be allowed for in any
democratic society), the union movement now finds itself with a membership
crisis (union density fell from 50% in 1976 to 35% in 1994, and only a quarter of
private sector employees are in unions), with unemployment at over 8%, and
with a number of institutional supports for union membership and bargaining
activity under threat from State and Federal governments.  Taken together, and
depending on what happens in the next few years at the political as well as the
industrial level, the legitimacy - if not survival - of the union movement in
Australia may well be at stake.
The aim of this paper is to make sense of this situation, in light of the
generally positive and distinctive impression which Australian union strategy
and industrial relations reform has had over the past 13 years.  It does so by
using an institutionalist, supply-side framework of industrial restructuring,
drawing on the work of Wolfgang Streeck.  Following a brief description of this
framework, the paper describes the reform agenda undertaken and shows that
Australia did indeed move in the direction urged by Streeck and others.  It then
assesses the apparently disappointing outcomes of these reform efforts, and
considers the implications which Australia's experience might have for those
interested in a social democratic supply-side reform agenda.
2. A social democratic reform model for the 1990s?
Streeck's institutional theory of the supply-side
2.1 The model
Skill-oriented strategies have become increasingly influential in discussions of
union policy in recent years (Mathews, 1989; Ewer et al., 1991; Ogden, 1993).
One of the most articulate advocates of such a strategy is Wolfgang Streeck.
Over the past decade, he has outlined 'an institutional theory of the supply side
of advanced capitalist economies' (Streeck, 1992a, p. vii).
2  In essence, he has
tried to show that 'different institutional conditions may give rise to different
production patterns', and that 'given the right kind of institutional regulation and
political intervention, an institutionally saturated and politically bargained pattern
of production and employment may be possible which may be highly
competitive in an open world economy' (Streeck, 1991, pp. 23-4).
                                                          
2 Emphasis is in the original in this and in subsequent direct quotes throughout the paper,
unless otherwise indicated.3
The particular production pattern with which Streeck is most concerned is
diversified quality production (DQP), one of several alternative conceptions of
how manufacturing in particular has changed since the late 1970s following the
widespread introduction of new microelectronic technologies.  It is closely
related (but not identical) to flexible specialisation (FS), new production
concepts, post-Fordism, etc.  Its essence is the 'high volume production of
customised quality-competitive goods' which results from 'mass producers
moving upmarket' or from 'craft producers extending their production volume'
(Streeck, 1991, p. 26).
Using Germany as his exemplar, Streeck argues that there is an 'interactive
configuration of policies and industrial structures which appear to have formed
a "virtuous circle" ideally matched to, and indeed almost making inevitable, an
industrial strategy of upmarket restructuring' such as DQP (Streeck, 1992a, p.
184).  Trade unions - suitably reformed - form an important element within this
virtuous circle and indeed are potentially one of the main agencies (along with
government and firms) responsible for achieving it.
Streeck's supply side institutionalism contains both economic and political
elements.  Economically, he argues that a rich array of institutions is
fundamental to achieving the full benefits of the new technologies, in terms of
production systems which supply high wages and good jobs.  Market-based
systems will inevitably under-invest in 'collective goods' such as industrial
peace, skills formation and flexible work organisation.  Without strong
institutions, a production system which focuses on lowering unit labour costs
through lay-offs, work intensification and wage cuts is likely to emerge.  This will
not only be detrimental to individual firms and industries, but will increase
dualisation within the workforce and the society at large.
His political project is also quite clear.  He does not accept that new
technology, competition, uncertainty and the search for flexibility inevitably
require neo-liberal policies aimed at sidelining unions and deregulating the
supply side of the economy.  Nor does he accept that the Japanese model of
'lean production' and enterprise unions is necessarily the best or only way
forward.  DQP in fact provides a reformed trade union movement, allied to a
social democratic politics, with numerous opportunities to intervene in the
economy, at a variety of levels, in support of traditional egalitarian concerns
which at the same time support, rather than inhibit, economic efficiency.
2.2 Five institutional conditions for DQP
In the following discussion, I adapt Streeck's approach by examining the extent
to which the reform agenda in Australia has pushed the institutional landscape4
in a direction favouring the adoption of DQP.  In doing so, and to keep the
analysis manageable, I have collapsed Streeck's set of institutional
requirements for DQP down to five areas, as described below.
2.2.1 Technical change and industrial democracy
Streeck argues that employee participation is crucial to generating the
consensus and understanding of production matters - particularly the
introduction and use of new technology - necessary for DQP.  Such
participation needs to be legally-binding (as in the system of works councils in
Germany), in order to ensure 'that it will not be unilaterally withdrawn in times of
economic hardship' (Streeck, 1991, p. 41).
2.2.2 Employment security and flexibility
Streeck suggests that DQP requires quite strong restrictions on employers'
access to the external labour market.  By making redundancies expensive, by
limiting the use of part-time and casual workers, and by offering long-term
employment guarantees to their employees, employers are forced to treat
workers as quasi-fixed factors of production, and therefore have a strong
incentive to use their skills and knowledge to the full (Streeck, 1987a, p. 452).
In return, employees have much greater security and are consequently much
more likely to accept the need to be flexible in undertaking broad and changing
work tasks brought about by changing markets and technology (Streeck,
1987b, pp. 293-4).
2.2.3  Industrial relations, work organisation and wage determination
Streeck argues that the industrial relations system should promote an anti-
Taylorist system of work organisation, which will maximise the productivity of
new technology and also be more acceptable to employees (who will be
demanding such work organisation through the participative mechanisms
mentioned above) (Streeck, 1987a, p. 450).  He also argues the need for a
more centralised system of wage determination which keeps wages relatively
high and differentials low.  In addition to its traditional macroeconomic
functions, such a system limits the opportunity and attractiveness for employers
to adopt a cost-minimisation production strategy (Streeck, 1992b, p. 264).
2.2.4 Skills and training
For Streeck, 'the central element of "effective supply" based on egalitarian
intervention in the labour market is training' (Streeck, 1988, p. 422).  However,5
the skills required for DQP must be of a particular kind.  Workers must have
broad and high level skills, which are general rather than firm-specific, able to
adapt to 'as yet unknown future uses' (Streeck, 1992b, p. 97).  To produce
these types of skills requires certain institutional arrangements – in particular,
mechanisms which avoid an over-reliance on the market provision of skills,
given the inherent tendency towards market failure in skill formation.
A number of features should therefore be present in a training regime
geared towards DQP: work-based (rather than purely school- or college-based)
training; linkages between wages and the skills workers possess (rather than
those they use at any one point in time); collectively negotiated enterprise and
industry-based training agreements for existing workers; relatively low trainee
wages to encourage firms to take on apprentices; corresponding regulation and
monitoring to prevent trainee exploitation and to ensure that skills are
transferable and general rather than firm-specific; and use of government and
union pressure to promote access and equity in training and skills provision
(Streeck, 1989, 1992b).
2.2.5 'Productivistic' trade unions
Streeck urges unions to adopt 'a productivistic strategy', whose central element
is a 'recognition of the need to restore efficiency and competitiveness ... in a
decentralised industrial relations system in which participation of workers and
interest representation by trade unions would be more closely than ever
integrated through co-decision rights with the management of production and ...
concerns for productivity' (Streeck, 1987b, p. 303).  Streeck suggests this role
requires a convergence of the best traditions of craft and industrial unionism in
a 'policy of negotiated general upskilling' (Streeck, 1992b, p. 267).  Industry
based unions with a strong presence in the workplace can retain a productive
focus while avoiding the trap of company unionism, which downplays unions'
traditional radical and egalitarian concerns (Streeck, 1992a, p. 167).  Industry
unionism also makes skills and training an issue for labour as a whole, rather
than leaving it as the preserve of a limited number of craft workers.
Such a strategy would combine 'independent, powerful representation of
member interests with a pursuit of general social and economic interests'
(Streeck, 1992b, p. 254).  Indeed, with neo-liberalism currently rampant,
Streeck considers that a system of DQP built around inclusive, skill-based
unionism provides the best basis for further radical challenges in the future.6
2.3 Critique
Streeck's institutional model of supply side reform can be criticised on various
grounds.  For example, it ignores private services and the public sector.  It also
tends to downplay the role of demand factors and of the risk of international
capital flight, if the conditions placed on capital by labour are too 'onerous'.  But
these elements can be added to the model without necessarily undermining it.
More serious, perhaps, is his uncertain position in the debate between
strategic choice theorists and those who argue for the primacy of inherited
structural, cultural, political and economic characteristics in determining
changes in industrial relations and production systems (Locke et al., 1995).  On
the one hand, the whole tenor of Streeck's work stresses the politically-
generated nature of the social institutions which propel companies to adopt
DQP.  Yet, on the other hand, he notes that 'success and failure in
manufacturing are of long making; they are the result of complex configurations
of forces that seem to be deeply rooted in national and organisational traditions'
(Streeck, 1987a, p. 459).  As a result, some companies and countries are
inherently more likely than others to move towards DQP.
Given this situation, what is the appropriate strategy for trade unions to
adopt if they are located in a neo-liberal political economy?  Are isolated
pockets of DQP-based firms better than nothing, or would they merely support
a new (or old) labour aristocracy?  Soskice (1996), for example, questions the
efficacy of uncoordinated market economies (such as the UK or Australia)
trying to emulate German or Japanese manufacturing strategies, arguing that
they do not have the prerequisite institutional conditions, and are unlikely to be
able to achieve them.  Instead, they should regard radical (often science-based)
innovations and the service sector as their institutional competitive advantage,
and build a mass higher education to support it, while using public sector
employment to accommodate those unable to participate in these industries.
However, even if we assume that positive change towards DQP is both
feasible and desirable, important questions remain unanswered.  For example:
which supply-side institutions are most crucial for DQP, and what is the relative
importance of unions, governments and employers in achieving positive
change?  The Australian experience should shed light on these questions.7
3. The model in practice: 'strategic unionism' in Australia,
1983-1996
Before outlining Australian efforts to reform the five areas which Streeck argues
constitute crucial institutional conditions for DQP, the position prevailing before
1983 is summarised.  It shows how Australia did not appear to be a good
prospect for Streeck's approach to restructuring.  However, a number of forces
for change emerged which made reform possible, and these are also
described, before moving on to the reforms themselves.
3.1 The situation prior to 1983
A system of conciliation and arbitration has governed industrial relations in
Australia since early this century (Deery, 1984).  Federal and State industrial
tribunals and commissions (hereafter, 'the Commission') are responsible for
ruling on industrial awards governing the wages and conditions of most workers
and for settling disputes.  Traditionally, the Commission operated with a very
narrow definition of what constituted an 'industrial dispute', confining it to wages
and conditions only.  Decisions about technological change or work
organisation were regarded as part of the function of management and
therefore not subject to bargaining or arbitration.
The arbitration system has had a major influence on the structure,
resources and attitudes of the main parties to the system – unions and
employers – and on the relationship between them (Curtain, 1990).  This in turn
has had a big impact on work organisation, technological change and skills
formation, resulting in what one commentator has described as a system of
'structured irresponsibility' (Rimmer, quoted in Curtain, 1990).
Under the protection of the arbitration system, occupational trade unionism
proliferated, to the extent that there were around 300 unions by the late 1980s.
Most of these were very small, with less than 10,000 members.  Union
resources were centralised in order to focus on events and hearings in the
Commission.  As a result, workplace union structures were generally weak, with
the exception of a few sectors in manufacturing where the metal unions had
strong shop steward organisations able to achieve over-award payments in
factories more able to pay higher wages.  But even there, debate over broader
enterprise issues was largely absent (except for the maintenance of
demarcation lines); unions were mainly concerned with ensuring wage parity for
tradespersons across industry.  Most unions were generally ill-equipped to
bargain over technology, work organisation or training issues.8
Employers were also unsuited and generally unwilling to negotiate
workplace issues.  Most technologies were imported from overseas, with little
control by local firms.  Employers had relatively under-developed workplace
bargaining structures, and relied heavily on employer organisations and tribunal
rulings.  Employer groups agreed with the Commission's narrow interpretation
of industrial matters and opposed participation by unions in what they saw as
management of the enterprise (Davis and Lansbury, 1989).  This extended to
issues of employment protection and redundancies, where employers had a
virtual free hand to hire and fire employees at will.
Industrial relations were therefore quite adversarial, with work organisation
being fragmented into numerous narrow job classifications which were
defended vigorously by craft unions and protected legally by the award system.
Since most workplaces were covered by multiple unions and awards, the
introduction of new technology or work methods often resulted in demarcation
disputes.
The small vocational education and training (VET) system was also
strongly influenced by the industrial relations system (Curtain, 1987).
Apprenticeship training was narrowly focused on single trade skills (protected
by craft unions), with an exclusively vocational curriculum which failed to adapt
to changes in technology.  Achieving skilled worker status was dependent on
time-serving rather than demonstrated competence.
The dominance of apprenticeship as the main mode of initial VET reflected
the influence of external labour markets (ELMs) in Australia. ELM orientation
was also evident from the reliance by employers on poaching workers from
other firms (and on immigration) to meet their higher skill needs; a flat earnings
profile for skilled workers (reflecting a lack of a career path within firms); high
labour turnover; and award provisions limiting upward progression for workers
based on skills.
This external market was quite narrow, however, as it applied to relatively
few occupations and workers.  Most workers in fact had no formal qualifications
and had little opportunity or incentive to acquire further skills, since there was
little prospect of having them recognised in terms of higher pay.  Adult
apprenticeships were fiercely and successfully resisted by craft unions, thereby
locking workers without apprenticeship training into unskilled or semi-skilled
positions.
ELMs restricted employers' incentives to train even their own trades
employees, given the fear of poaching, and because narrow job classifications
and accompanying demarcations prevented employers from using the skills of
better trained workers to their full capacity.9
One positive aspect of the award system, however, was its effect on the
level and distribution of wages.  A minimum wage based on the need for a
'living wage' (rather than ability to pay) kept weaker groups of workers better off
than their overseas counterparts in more decentralised bargaining systems
(Buchanan, 1992; Daly and Gregory, 1992).  Occupational unions and awards
resulted in broad parity of wages within occupations across different firms and
sectors, while national wage cases, based on maintaining relativities between
occupations, allowed lower paid workers to achieve increases in wages and
conditions as a result of 'flow ons' from successful industrial action by more
militant workers and unions.  Equal pay provisions introduced in the 1970s,
combined with a number of supporting pieces of legislation, also resulted in
women's wages being a much higher proportion of the average male wage rate
than in most other countries (Daly and Gregory, 1992).
3.2 Forces for change
From this rather unpromising position, a number of factors emerged which
influenced and shaped changes in training, work organisation and industrial
relations.  The most important included the Accord, the economy, the
employers and, perhaps most significantly, the unions.
3.2.1 The Accord
The  Accord between the Labor Government and the Australian Council of
Trade Unions (ACTU) was a type of social exchange which provided for
supportive social policies in return for wage restraint by the trade union
movement (ALP/ACTU, 1983). It formed the essential backdrop to macro and
micro economic policy in Australia under the Labor Government from 1983 to
1996.
3
Under the Accord, the Labor Government enacted several measures - such
as compulsory superannuation, a national health system, large increases in
childcare provision, and support for lower income families - which bolstered the
'social wage' and promoted other union objectives.  This was crucial in
maintaining union support in the face of difficult economic circumstances.
                                                          
3 The original Accord was renegotiated several times; at the time of 1996 election, the ACTU
and ALP had just agreed on Accord mark VIII, although of course it will not be implemented,
following the government's defeat.10
3.2.2 The economy
A second factor forcing change was the economy. Australia's traditional
dependence on primary commodities, with a small highly protected
manufacturing sector, resulted in a rigid, unresponsive, inward-looking and
uncompetitive economy, with poor management skills, a narrowly educated and
skilled workforce, and adversarial, unproductive labour relations.
A consensus emerged, particularly in the wake of a terms of trade crisis in
1985-86, that Australia must become an efficient, export-oriented economy,
built around value-added production of quality goods and services which would
enable Australia's high wages and living standards to be maintained.  A
widespread acceptance emerged of the importance of wealth generation (as
well as distribution), and of the need for fundamental changes to training and
the workplace to improve productivity, quality and competitiveness.
3.2.3 Employers
Interestingly, employers were not the prime movers in changes to the industrial
relations system - at least initially.  This was partly because they were not
parties to the Accord, but partly too the result of divisions between them over
the direction of industrial relations reform.  In particular, they held different
views over the likely impact of decentralised bargaining on aggregate wage
outcomes, over the role of trade unions in the system, and over how change
should be achieved. These initial divisions allowed the ACTU more control over
the direction of industrial relations than might otherwise have been expected,
given the deregulation of other areas of the economy (Galligan and Singleton,
1991).
However, divisions between employers began to diminish by the early
1990s with the onset of recession.  Their agenda now supported enterprise
bargaining, a reduction in the influence of unions and the Commission over
enterprise agreements, a slimmed down set of basic award provisions, and in
some instances a shift to individual employee contracts in place of award
coverage or collective provisions governing work relations.  These views
became increasingly influential, particularly with the election of conservative
governments at State level (Matthews, 1994).
3.2.4 Unions
Trade unions initiated many of the biggest changes in the Australian industrial
relations system. In effecting these changes, unions shifted from a defensive
'labourism' towards a pro-active stance termed 'strategic unionism', aimed at
revitalising and restructuring Australian industry and the economy.11
The three factors mentioned above were instrumental in bringing about this
change in union strategy: the Accord 'created the climate for co-operative
change.  And the need to restructure the economy to improve its long term
performance ... provided the motivation' (Curtain, 1990, p. 4).  Furthermore, the
threat from 'New Right' employers generated the fear within the movement to
rule out complacency as an option (Berry and Kitchener, 1989).
The most important landmark in this program was the publication of
Australia Reconstructed in 1987 by the ACTU (ACTU/TDC, 1987).  The report,
which followed a Government sponsored mission to Western Europe, argued
that Australia needed to learn from British experience about the likely
consequences of a 'business as usual' approach (Berry and Kitchener, 1989)
and should instead look to (West) Germany and especially Sweden as models
of how economic and industrial development could be combined with a strong
union movement.
A clear element in the success of these countries was held to be their
integrated approach to policy.  They combined an active labour market policy,
strategic trade, industry and investment policies, a highly skilled workforce, and
a cooperative and participative management style which used workers,
technology, and modern production and work organisation in an economy
dedicated to making high quality, value-added goods which did not rely on low
price as their main competitive advantage - Streeck's DQP model, in other
words.
The ACTU's strategy, as expressed in the report, required a combination of
policies aimed at the macro-economy; wages, prices and incomes; trade and
industry; labour market programs; industrial democracy; and strategic unionism.
However, the trade and industry policy elements of the strategy received little
support from government or business in the debate which followed the release
of the report.  Instead, in common with Streeck, the micro agenda came to
assume priority in both the ACTU's strategy and in wider policy debates, with a
cluster of interrelated elements being seen as vital if Australian industry is to
compete in world markets.  The report argued specifically that there was an
'integral relationship between the level of technology, appropriate forms of work
organisation, skill formation and modern industrial relations' (ACTU/TDC, 1987,
p. 154).
We now look at how reform was attempted in each of the five institutional
areas specified earlier, noting at the outset that the relative failure to directly
influence the first two, namely technological change and industrial democracy,
and employment security and the rise in 'flexible' employment, led unions to
direct more attention to the latter three.  These were not only important in their
own right, but unions hoped that they would simultaneously achieve increased
participation at the workplace and increase the skills and (functional) flexibility12
of their 'core' workforce sufficiently to reduce the need for employers to resort to
non-standard employment.
3.3 Technical change and industrial democracy
The original Accord committed the government to 'support the establishment of
rights for employees, through their unions, to be notified and consulted by
employers about the proposed introduction of technological change'.  The
following two years saw a series of breakthroughs in State and Federal
industrial commissions.  The most significant was the Termination, Change and
Redundancy (TCR) national test case decision in 1984, which imposed a
requirement on employers to consult with employees and unions before
introducing major changes to production methods or to the structure of their
organisation (Deery, 1984).
This decision was strengthened by the Federal Public Service Reform Act
1984, which required each department to develop an industrial democracy plan
in conjunction with relevant unions.  By 1991, nearly all departments had sub-
committees on occupational health and safety and on equal employment
opportunity, and a substantial number also had sub-committees dealing with
technical change (DIR, 1991).
There was also support for industrial democracy at the national level from
government, industry and trade unions.  The Federal Government released a
discussion paper in December 1986 (DEIR, 1986) which stressed the need for
increased employee participation, but ruled out a prescriptive, legislative
approach.  Following its release, peak union and business groups issued a
number of joint statements supporting increased consultation, information
sharing and participation, regarding them as an essential part of economic
reform (CAI/ACTU, 1988; CAI/BCA/ACTU, 1986; NLCC, 1988).  The
importance of such participative practices to the successful introduction and
operation of new technology was highlighted.
Taken together, these developments appeared to herald a new era in union
and employee influence over the process of change (including technical
change), and over the workplace in general (Davis and Lansbury, 1989).
However, subsequent case studies (Collins, 1988; Deery, 1989; Frankel, 1990)
and surveys (Callus et al., 1991) have continued to show a limited degree of
union influence over technical change.
This is attributable partly to factors peculiar to the TCR decision, which only
obliged employers to inform and consult with employees and their unions after
a definite decision to purchase and introduce new technology had been made.13
It also did not require the two parties to reach agreement about the issue –
management retained final decision-making power (Deery, 1989a).
Other factors were also relevant.  One was the relatively slow rate of
technological innovation in Australian industry.  A survey in 1991 showed that
only 41% of manufacturing establishments had introduced any types of
advanced manufacturing technologies, and half had neither acquired, nor had
plans to acquire, any of the surveyed technologies within the next five years
(ABS, Cat. No. 8123.0).
  Most crucially, TCR did not address the structural weaknesses of the
industrial relations system by prescribing institutional mechanisms (such as
consultative committees) through which negotiation over technical change
should be pursued.
However, technological change has not been ignored by unions.  Instead,
their approach to it has changed.  TCR – as a vehicle for negotiating
technological change – has been virtually discarded.  As one senior ACTU
official has argued, 'just focussing on particular technological change in
isolation ... is a short sighted approach that will fail in the long term.  Hence we
have sought to get unions to negotiate the introduction of technological change
as one important part of a total system, rather than as a thing in itself' (Ogden,
1990, p. 3).  This is the 'strategic unionism' approach discussed further below.
More recently, as the industrial relations system has moved towards an
enterprise focus, requirements for worker participation and consultation have
been included in the various wage-fixing principles adopted by the Commission.
The 1994 Industrial Relations Reform Act also included a requirement that all
employees to be covered by enterprise agreements must be consulted,
including certain groups of vulnerable workers such as women, youth and
people from non-English speaking backgrounds.  The type of consultation was
not prescribed, however, and it is still too early to determine the extent and form
which it has taken.
3.4 Labour flexibility and employment security
Australia has always had a very 'externally flexible' labour market.  Almost a
quarter of the workforce are either part-time or casual employees, with a high
correlation between the two (i.e., only about a third of part-time workers are in
permanent positions).  Coupled with increasing numbers of self-employed and
home workers, it seems clear that 'the Australian labour market is inexorably
becoming more flexible and more deregulated' (Burgess, 1990, p. 251).   A14
major part of this 'flexibility' stems from the limited nature of employment
security embedded in the labour market.
The TCR decision in 1984 introduced the first elements of employment
protection into Australia by establishing minimum rights to notification and
severance pay for workers being made redundant.  While important for the
workers affected, the decision has not changed the traditional tendency of
employers in Australia to resort to the external labour market as a way of
achieving organisational and labour flexibility.  Around 20% of employees
change jobs every year, with the result that 'Australia has one of the shortest
average lengths of stay in jobs of any country in the OECD'  (Committee on
Employment Opportunities, 1993, p. 38).
High redundancy and retrenchment rates are a major source of high job
mobility and low job tenure: in some years, over 6% of the labour force have
been retrenched (ACIRRT, 1994, p. 16).  Private sector companies are more
than twice as likely to opt for compulsory redundancies - the classic 'externally
flexible' adjustment strategy - as for redeployment.
Employment protection provisions were extended by legislation in 1994,
based on ILO conventions.  These provisions provoked a heated response from
employers, who claimed it would deter employment creation by increasing the
cost of dismissing workers, and place undue restrictions on their rights to 'hire
and fire' employees (Australian Financial Review, 16 May 1994).  The
legislation was subsequently amended to restrict employee access to the
legislation, to reduce the maximum payout for wrongful dismissal, and to
balance the onus of proof aspects between employers and employees.  Under
the new Coalition government, the provisions are likely to be watered down
further.
Failure to reform Australia's 'externally flexible' industrial relations system
through legislative or regulatory remedies aimed at specific issues such as
technology or employment security, led unions to focus much more on the
organisation of work, the associated structure and strategy of industry, and the
inadequate skills of workers as the major causes of these more deep-seated
problems.  Supporting Streeck's contention that 'flexibility' and 'rigidity' are two
sides of the same coin, unionists in Australia began to argue that their 'best
defence against extreme casualisation and sub-contracting is to have a highly
skilled local workforce' (Ogden, 1991, p.4).  In other words, to avoid or reduce
the need for externally flexible employment required the development of
internally flexible employees through the reform of work organisation, skill
formation and union structures.  The result has been the adoption of a
conscious strategy of 'strategic unionism', which directly addresses the other
three supply side institutions in Streeck's model and, in so doing, also tackles
the first two.15
3.5 Industrial relations, work organisation and wage
determination
3.5.1 Strategy
The primary mechanism through which work reorganisation has been pursued
in Australia has been the industrial relations system, which has evolved from a
highly centralised to a much more decentralised framework, while retaining a
'public interest' orientation through the mechanism of the national wage case,
overseen by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission.
The Commission used its legal authority over wage setting to establish a
link between the wages system and economic performance which involved both
macro and micro elements.  Over time it placed increasing focus on the latter
as the industrial parties grew more confident of their ability to conduct
workplace negotiations and as recession reduced the prospects of a wages
breakout.
Three national wage case decisions were particularly important.  In each
case, the Commission broadly followed submissions put by the ACTU and the
Federal Government.  Legislative changes (in which unions were closely
involved) have also been important in shifting industrial relations towards an
enterprise focus.
The 1987 Restructuring and Efficiency Principle (REP) decision was the
first important departure from automatic cost-of-living wage adjustments which
had characterised the initial Accord.  It established a 'two tier' system - the first
being a flat wage rise for all, while the second tier offered a wage rise of up to
4% on a case-by-case basis depending on progress made on changes to work
and management practices and on action to reduce demarcation barriers and
advance multi-skilling, training and re-training.
The 1988 Structural Efficiency Principle (SEP) decision provided for a
fundamental review of the industrial awards governing wages and conditions of
work.  SEP explicitly aimed to 'provide workers with access to more varied,
fulfilling and better paid jobs', primarily through the establishment of skill-related
career paths as an incentive for workers to improve their skills and earning
capacity through training.
The SEP soon became associated with a process known as 'award
restructuring', because a major objective and effect of the SEP was to overhaul
the complex industrial awards governing the wages and conditions of the
workforce, in order to bring them into line with the new type of work16
organisation, skills and wages system implied by the SEP and advocated by the
ACTU.
The union movement's agenda is more prominent under the SEP than the
REP.  In particular, its broader interpretation of flexibility within the workplace is
evident in the notion of 'skill formation', which became central to the whole
reform process.  This involves the provision of vertical career paths (with a
smaller number of skill-based wage levels, rather than the myriad of narrow job
and wage classifications normally contained in awards), backed up by
appropriate training.  This vertical approach to the skill formation of employees
contrasted with employers' typical 'multi-skilling' agenda, which often involved
only a horizontal breaking down of demarcation lines across similar skill levels.
In addition, through its commitment to the maintenance of relativities across
awards, the Commission retained an important equalising effect within the
wages system.
As award restructuring developed, the wages system was faced with
increasing demands for change towards a greater enterprise focus from
government, employers and some unions who saw opportunities to gain greater
wage gains than the centralised system allowed.  By late 1991, despite some
misgivings about the macro-economic risks of a totally enterprise-based wages
system, the Commission adopted a new Enterprise Bargaining Principle (EBP),
allowing unlimited wage rises to be negotiated between unions and employers
in return for improved productivity at the enterprise. The Commission would
conciliate in disputes but not arbitrate, thus putting the onus on the parties to
reach agreement.  However, the Commission placed a number of important
conditions on the negotiations before it would ratify agreements: they needed to
be consistent with the SEP, to address a broad agenda, to retain workers'
earnings and award conditions, and to be bargained by unions through a single
bargaining unit.
Thus the Commission specified a 'floor' or 'safety net' of minimum
conditions which agreements could not breach, thereby answering one of the
union movement's main concerns about unfettered enterprise bargaining.  The
central role of the Commission in overseeing the introduction of enterprise
bargaining had the effect of continuing to keep a 'public interest' test on the
exercise.  However, there was no maximum wage rise specified, which put the
onus on other actors and policy instruments to perform the incomes policies
tasks formerly performed by the national wage case.
The initial effect of the EBP was relatively limited, with most agreements
coming in the metals industry based on a framework agreement signed
between the peak union and employer bodies in that industry in late 1991.
Reasons for the slow response to the EBP included the recession, the fairly
strict interpretation put on the 'public interest' test by the Commission, and the17
substantial effort which was required from the parties for genuine productivity
agreements to be reached.
Faced with the relatively slow diffusion of enterprise bargaining, the Federal
government amended the Industrial Relations Act in 1992 to virtually eliminate
the pubic interest test, and give the Commission little discretion in dealing with
agreements coming before it.  As a result, the number of enterprise bargains
increased markedly.  Following Labor's surprise election victory in March 1993,
the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1994 introduced a new form of enterprise
agreement available to non-union enterprises.  However, a number of
conditions were placed on these agreements, following negotiations between
the government and the ACTU (Green, 1994).  A majority of employees in the
workplace must approve the agreement, a 'no disadvantage' test (ensuring that
no employee is worse off under the agreement) still applies, there must be
dispute settling procedures in place, employees must have been consulted, the
agreement must satisfy anti-discrimination provisions, and – most significantly –
unions can make submissions to the Commission when the agreement comes
before it, to raise objections under these various conditions.
The national wage case decision in October 1993 also added a new
'arbitrated safety net adjustment principle'.  This effectively gave an $8 per
week pay rise to about a million low paid workers who had been unable to
achieve gains through enterprise bargaining, thereby retaining a centralised
(and egalitarian) wages element to the system.
3.5.2 Outcomes
How effective have these changes been in transforming workplace bargaining
and work organisation?  Here, we examine developments under the various
wage principles.
The overall impression of the second tier approach under the REP is two-
fold.  On the one hand, it was seen by most observers as a step forward in
forcing the industrial partners to focus on enterprise level change, which had
always been weak in the Australian system.  On the other hand, a narrow, cost-
cutting, 'trade-off' mentality was adopted by most employers, which was
resented by unions and workers, and made them suspicious of similar
exercises in the future.  Only where workplace union structures were strong
enough to introduce the broader agenda of the peak union bodies, as in the
metal industry (where shop steward organisation had always been stronger),
was there a significant challenge to this pattern.  Consequently, the award
restructuring process under SEP, which promised a much broader agenda and
was specifically designed not to be carried out with a narrow, cost-cutting focus,
was seen as a decided improvement (Belchamber, 1994).18
Most advance under the SEP was made by the metals and engineering
industry, the traditional pacesetter in industrial relations in Australia (Plowman,
1990).  Extended negotiations in this industry resulted in an overhauling of the
old award, and major changes to the organisation of work and industrial
relations procedures.  The most significant change was the creation of a new
job and wage classification structure which replaced over 300 job classifications
and 1400 different pay rates with 14 skill-based categories of occupational
groups, embracing all employees in the industry from a new 'unskilled' entrant
to a professional engineer.  The new job classifications are defined in terms of
generic skills and are accompanied by a new training structure which enables
the career path to work.  Other important changes to the award include
provision for consultation at plant level, and increased flexibility on issues such
as leave arrangements, meal breaks, the spread of hours, etc.
Evidence of actual progress in firms under the new metal award and the
SEP is patchy, as in most other industries.  The metal industry was the main
source of enterprise agreements under the more stringent EBP (i.e. before the
July 1992 amendments), suggesting that agreements in that industry were
among the most comprehensive.
Similarly structured awards have now been established in many other
industries and companies.  Most involve a sharp reduction in the number of job
classifications and increased job mobility and enlargement, in return for
increased training and a commitment by employers to a new, skills-based
wages classification system.
Change has not been confined to the private sector.  The Australian Public
Service has restructured its clerical, keyboard and administrative grades,
covering some 73,000 (mostly female) employees (Curtain, 1990).
Demarcation-ridden structures have been overhauled and a new classification
structure introduced.  Functional flexibility and career progression have been
encouraged, especially for employees formerly restricted to keyboard work.
Integration of keyboard, clerical and administrative work has been central to the
process, so that typing and word processing pools have been virtually
eliminated and author keying has increased.
A different example of public sector reform comes from Australia Post (AP),
which until recently had a history of industrial confrontation and union
resistance to the introduction of new technology.  Studies of the introduction of
Optical Character Recognition technology into AP (Mathews, 1991) have shown
a vastly improved picture as a result of a highly participative process in the
introduction of the new technology.  An essential prerequisite for change was
that job security for existing workers was guaranteed at the outset – although
natural attrition and voluntary early retirement schemes will mean a net loss in
jobs overall.19
A less encouraging picture emerges from a study of five rail systems
(Curtain, 1991).  Despite extensive consultation, new job classification systems
had been extremely difficult to develop and, in particular, to implement.  The
large size of the organisations, a failure to devolve authority, steeper
hierarchies and strong political and economic pressures for cost-cutting, meant
that SEP had not advanced very far.  These problems were repeated in other
large, public sector business enterprises with high proportions of blue collar
workers.
But in general, the overwhelming majority of awards in Australia have been
restructured along the lines of the SEP agenda of reducing the number of job
classifications and introducing career paths for all workers.  This is undoubtedly
an historic achievement, and one in which the union movement was a prime
instigator, assisted by the Commission.
Restructured awards, though, are primarily enabling measures - they do
not of themselves bring about change at the enterprise.  This of course was the
main agenda under the EBP, although it is more difficult to ascertain the extent
of reform at this level because of the greater variability between firms than
between industries, and because enterprise level reforms have not had as
much time to be implemented and analysed.
Case studies have shown a number of world class examples of enterprise
reform (Mathews, 1995), but the more comprehensive survey of Australian
workplaces, AWIRS, suggests that while change has been occurring in almost
all workplaces (over 80% of workplaces experienced at least one type of
organisational change), less than a tenth of workplaces had experienced five or
more changes, suggesting that an integrated approach was not common
(Callus et al., 1991).
Looking specifically at work organisation, AWIRS indicated that substantial
change has occurred in a number of areas, particularly staff appraisal, formal
training and job redesign.  However, it is very difficult to determine the
economic effect of these changes, as few managers (only 11% of workplaces)
use a quantity based measure of labour productivity.
One of the most significant findings was the general lack of bargaining
resources and machinery at the workplace.  Only 14% of workplaces (covering
40% of employees) could be classified as 'active bargainers' (Callus et al.,
1991, p. 157).  Yet analysis shows that there was a clear relationship between
intensity of collaboration and workplace performance (Ellem, 1991; Green,
1991).  This suggests the continued importance of supportive government
workplace reform programs, Commission monitoring of enterprise agreements
and union involvement in workplace change.20
3.5.3 Conclusion
Work organisation in Australia cannot yet claim to be near the form and
standard required by Streeck's DQP.  A major problem is the historical legacy of
Australian industrial relations, in particular its weak bargaining infrastructure at
the workplace coupled with generally poor management.
4
  This is an important
reason why enterprise bargaining presents such a dilemma for the union
movement in Australia.
On the one hand, it is clear that for work organisation reform to be
achieved, then bargaining at the enterprise level must be entered into.  On the
other hand, enterprise bargaining contains many dangers for unions and
workers.  Unions have always been at their weakest at enterprise level,
particularly during a recession, and even more so in Australia given the union
movement's historical reliance on the Commission.  Many firms have apparently
used the less stringent enterprise bargaining provisions to go for 'quick fix'
productivity improvements which do not address the long-term work
organisation reform agenda of the unions (Kelly, 1994, pp. 143-144).
Furthermore, the linking of the national wage principles to the industrial
relations reform agenda, including enterprise bargaining, has weakened the
traditional egalitarian bias in Australian wage fixing.  While the award system
still provides for safety net wage increases, fully fledged enterprise bargaining
is likely to increase wage dispersion, with weakly organised workers (such as
women, young people and migrants) being particularly badly affected
(Buchanan, 1992).
Both these dangers will likely increase in the future.  Even prior to the
recent Federal election, there had been major challenges to the Accord's
industrial relations reforms.  A small number of large employers, notably in the
resources sector, have challenged the principles of collective bargaining and
union representation; some have successfully attracted union members away
from the award onto individual employment contracts, in return for much higher
pay.  In the previous union stronghold of the iron ore industry in north-western
Australia, such tactics (helped by the recession) have succeeded in largely de-
unionising much of the workforce.  At the same time, conservative State
governments have established their own system of individual contracts,
downplaying (and, in Victoria, abolishing) the award system.  Significantly,
individual contracts and enterprise agreements under these systems allow for
downward flexibility of wages and conditions, unlike in the Federal system.
Many unions in these states responded by shifting to the Federal Commission's
                                                          
4 One study has shown that Australian managers and supervisors are the least well educated
in a comparison with Britain, France, Germany, Japan and the US (Australian Mission on
Management Skills, 1991).21
jurisdiction, with its entrenched safeguards, but this route is probably now
redundant with the election of the Federal Coalition government.
3.6 Skills and training
3.6.1 Strategy
Award restructuring and Australia Reconstructed combined to act as 'circuit
breakers' in the low skill equilibrium which had characterised Australia's training
system.  Thereafter, training reform began to take shape, and skill formation
became central to union strategy.  Crucially, training was no longer seen to be
the sole preserve of craft workers and their unions, but a right and a necessity
for all workers.  Award restructuring provided the opportunity to link the skills
formation process with the wages system, while the Accord ensured that the
ACTU would have a major influence over the tripartite structures which needed
to be established to put the new training system in place.
Two important processes were set in train by award restructuring: the
grouping together of jobs (through 'broadbanding' classifications) as a means of
reducing horizontal demarcations; and attaching different wage levels to these
broadbanded job classifications and linking them vertically in a 'skills ladder'
which allowed workers to progress from one level to the next through the
acquisition of increased skill.
These requirements had a number of important implications.  Most
obviously, skill related career paths required standards against which a worker's
skills could be assessed, with entry and exit points to enable progression up the
skills ladder.  The SEP decision was also concerned to maintain wage (and
hence skill) relativities within and across awards, which meant that industry and
national consistency was required in setting standards.  Furthermore, given that
most workers lacked formal qualifications, it became imperative to find a way to
recognise prior learning and to include skills acquired at the workplace as well
as in formal training courses, if the career path was to have any real impact at
lower levels.  And the industry partners now had to include training and skills
recognition in their negotiations over wages and conditions.
Australia's national VET system was not well equipped to deliver these
outcomes, so a series of policies and structures has been put in place since
1989 which together comprise the National Training Reform Agenda (NTRA).
These policies and structures have involved the development of a national22
policy framework for VET, a move to competency-based training, and new
entry-level training arrangements.
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The most significant institutional reform was the establishment in 1992 of
the Australian National Training Authority (ANTA), which is responsible for
overseeing State and Federal government VET expenditure.  ANTA has a
legislative mandate to develop a national strategic plan for VET based upon
agreed national goals drawn up by ministers and developed in conjunction with
State training authorities and industry training advisory bodies.
The link which was introduced between wages and skill definitions by
award restructuring and the SEP required skill standards to be defined and
registered.  In 1989, a National Training Board (NTB) was established which
was responsible for endorsing the skill standards developed by industry bodies.
The governments also agreed to move to a competency-based training
(CBT) system, overseen by the NTB, which will eventually cover school, VET
and higher education.  CBT requires a number of inter-related components:
competency standards; training and curriculum development; accreditation;
training delivery; assessment; certification; monitoring and verification; and
review.
The first of these, the development of national (core) competency
standards, became the NTB's highest priority.  They are developed by tripartite
industry training bodies, and then submitted to the NTB (now abolished with its
functions transferred to ANTA) for endorsement and ratification.  Core
competency standards exist at industry, cross-industry and enterprise levels.
The NTB's first task, then, was to develop an Australian Standards
Framework (ASF).  The ASF, which consists of eight competency levels, acts
as a common benchmark against which the competency standards developed
by industry can be assessed and through which vocational training and
qualifications can be compared.  With the ASF broadly in place, the other
components of the new CBT system are now being pursued.
Unlike many countries, initial VET took a back seat in Australia's training
reforms until award restructuring was well under way.  Now, the plan is for all
existing types of apprenticeships and traineeships to be incorporated into a
greatly expanded and integrated entry-level training system based on
competency rather than time serving, known as the Australian Vocational
Training System (AVTS).  AVTS certificates can be achieved through several
pathways, including work, technical college and school, built around delivery of
seven key competencies.  Three levels of certificate, aligned with the three
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lower levels of the ASF, will assist the incorporation of the AVTS into the
industrial training and skills framework being developed separately.
3.6.2 Outcomes
In terms of aggregate indicators, substantial increases in post-compulsory
participation rates have occurred.  Where only one third of students completed
year 12 in the early 1980s, by 1993 almost 80% did so.  There has also been
increased participation in post-school education and training, although most of
this has occurred in higher rather than in vocational education.
Surveys of employer training expenditure (ABS Cat. No. 6353.0) show quite
extensive increases in a relatively short period, including expenditure by
medium sized firms – exactly those firms targeted by the NTRA.
While casual and part-time employees are still less likely to receive training
than full-time, permanent employees, there are some positive indicators as far
as equity is concerned. Health and safety, plant and machinery, and induction
training have all increased – areas associated with lower skilled workers.
Labourers, plant and machine operators, salespeople and clerks have
increased their qualifications markedly, including in the certificate/diploma area
– areas targeted by award restructuring and the NTRA.
For  industry-based training, the centrality of CBT meant that the most
important requirement was the establishment of competency standards and
associated training materials to support these standards.  Progress on both
fronts was slow, and 'far more complicated and resource intensive than initially
thought' (ACG, 1994, p. 19).
As expected, the metal and engineering industry was the most advanced in
adapting to the new system.  The new Metal Industry Award arranges
classification levels in a career path, aligned to industry qualifications which are
in turn aligned to the ASF.  Skills attained in one level are prerequisites for the
next level.  A non-trades adult worker can now undertake trade or technician
level training, although some bridging courses may be required.
Many process industries have also introduced certificated career paths for
process workers up to the level of tradesperson, although there is uncertainty
(and dispute) over the transferability of these qualifications outside their
industry.  However, some industries, such as petroleum refining, have resisted
an industry model, preferring enterprise-based training systems instead.
At the enterprise and workplace level, survey findings show that training
expenditure has been increasing, and that the coverage of employees being24
trained has also increased to some extent.  Indeed, the national wage
principles were having an effect on training effort well before much of the NTRA
was in place.  One survey found 25% of workplaces had introduced formal
training directly as a result of the 1987 REP decision (Callus et al., 1991, p.
332).
Training has become an important industrial relations issue.  Over half of
Federal workplace agreements include training and skill formation provisions
(DIR, 1993).  However, only a small minority of agreements have
comprehensive training arrangements as part of the enterprise agreement.
Most saw training mainly as a means to greater flexibility in how skills are
deployed in the workplace (i.e. overcoming demarcation), rather than as part of
a commitment to national standards (Curtain, 1994).
Disappointingly, the quality of apprenticeship training does not yet appear
to have changed much, although fears that the system may collapse do not
appear to have been borne out.  Apprenticeship provisions in awards still
overwhelmingly relate to wages and conditions rather than the content of
training, indicating that employment rather than skill formation remains its
defining characteristic.  The AVTS may overcome these problems, but it has
been slow to start  (Curtain, 1994).
The interconnectedness of the NTRA has been one of its main attractions
to the union movement.  It provides workers at all levels with the possibility of
being trained in broad skills, linked to wages and arranged in a career path,
which are recognised and transferable across firms, industries and States.
However, the effect of the interlocking nature of the system has 'at times ... led
to articulation and credit transfer between levels occupying greater energies
than the inherent quality of the provision within each level' (Sweet, 1993, p. 23).
Implementation remains a major issue, with the ACTU (and many others)
complaining that the NTRA has become too bureaucratic, complex and
removed from the industry partners.  Constant disputes between State and
Federal governments over the distribution of training funds through ANTA have
further contributed to this problem.
Substantive differences over the direction and control of the NTRA have
also slowed its progress and reduced its effectiveness.  Many educationalists
oppose the whole idea of converging general and vocational education and
have successfully resisted major curriculum changes at schools. Industry
understanding and acceptance of CBT has also been low.
Another question concerns whether the training system should be
promoting external or internal labour markets.  Non-craft unions have managed
to achieve career paths for their members within certain industries, but there is25
a lack of clarity about how far up the skills ladder these career paths can go if
craft-minded unions continue to insist upon national ELMs for their members.
Meanwhile, some larger employers have succeeded in getting approval for an
enterprise stream for competency standards, breaking with the original national
and industry orientation of the training reforms.
A third issue relates to the linkage between industrial relations and training.
Employers have resisted the idea of paying wages for skills acquired rather
than those used in the workplace.   The ACTU has reluctantly conceded the
issue by agreeing that 'achievement of skills and a qualification at a particular
ASF level does not establish automatic access to a given classification or pay
level' (JITEC, 1994, p. 6).
On youth training, craft-minded unions have prevented a major shift
towards a training, as opposed to employment, basis for apprenticeships by
refusing to accept a lower training wage. Unions continue to worry that
employers will use lower trainee wages as a way of reducing adult wages and
exploiting young people. This suggests a continued lack of trust between
unions and companies, and that industrial democracy and work organisation
issues have yet to be resolved in many workplaces.
3.6.3 Conclusion
Many of Streeck's prescriptions have been adopted in the skill formation
strategy of Australian unionism.  Training has become a top priority; a work-
based training system (apprenticeships) has been maintained; formal and
recognised training has been introduced for adult workers; industrial relations
have been linked to skill formation, with elements of a pay for skills acquired
system; and there has been a determined attempt to go beyond enterprise
specific, market-driven skill formation by including a significant regulatory and
collective component to ensure workers receive transferable and broad-based
training.
However, the NTRA has not yet met the ACTU's hopes for skill-oriented
unionism.  The orthodox explanation sees failures in administration and
implementation, rather than a lack of commitment by unions and business, as
the main problem (ACG, 1994; Sweet, 1993).  The solution, according to this
interpretation, is to increase the flexibility of the system through greater
devolution of responsibility for the reforms to 'clients' (particularly employers).
This is likely to be the new government's attitude.
An alternative interpretation worries that shifting the focus to employers and
the enterprise level will actually undo the principle aim of achieving broadly
transferable qualifications for all workers (Hampson et al., 1994).  The26
successful push by large employers for an 'enterprise stream' in the national
competency standards is symptomatic of this trend. Similarly, exhortations to
separate out industrial relations issues from the training agenda will assist
employers in pursuing an enterprise-based training system, with little or no
connection to the unions' broader skill-oriented agenda. Under this
interpretation, it is employers' lack of commitment to training which is the main
issue.
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The ACTU accepts that the NTRA has become too bureaucratic, but it
acknowledges the potential dangers posed by 'reaction from conservative
forces' (ACTU, 1993, p. 121).  Its ambivalence is reflected in its attitude towards
the issue of pay for skills acquired versus pay for skills required.  While 'the
bottom line on remuneration is that the pay rate received must ultimately reflect
the value of the employee to the employer', the ACTU also believes that
'standardised training ... will have a bearing on the minimum rate of pay'
(Mansfield, 1993, pp. 22-25).  This leaves open the question of whether pay for
skills acquired is to be a minimum or optional condition.
As with work organisation reform, a principal problem for unions is the
mismatch between their training agenda and the resources at their disposal for
achieving it.  Unions have had an impact at levels over which they have most
influence: industrial awards, tripartite industry and national training bodies, etc.
(although even at industry level, the resource-intensity of the NTRA has
stretched unions to the limit).  At enterprise and workplace levels, however, the
NTRA has been much more disappointing, through a combination of poor
program design, employer opposition and complacency, and union weakness
and division.
A related problem is the uneasy mix of models for initial and continuing
VET (in particular, between internal and external labour markets).  Without a
clear break with craft union traditions or opposition to an incipient enterprise
unionism, the solidaristic and inclusive skill-oriented unionism initiated in
Australia could slide back into a narrow and self-seeking 'skill capture' model of
trade unionism.  This prospect, among other things, has led the union
movement to reform its own structures - the fifth of Streeck's institutional
conditions for DQP.
                                                          
6 The demise of the Australian Training Guarantee is illustrative here.  The Training Guarantee
was introduced in 1990 and required most businesses to spend at least 1.5% of payroll on
eligible training programs.  It was consistently opposed by employers and eventually
'suspended' in July 1994, with little prospect of reinstatement.27
3.7 Reforming the union movement
In 1986, Australia had more than 300, mainly small, under-resourced,
occupationally-based unions - as many as there had been eighty years earlier.
A two-pronged strategy of union amalgamations and rationalisation of
bargaining structures was therefore developed to overcome the negative effects
caused by this structure, such as multi-unionism within enterprises and
constant demarcation disputes.
Most progress has been made on amalgamations.  The ACTU's goal of
having almost all unionists in around 20 large unions was virtually completed by
the end of 1995.  This is an astonishing achievement from an historical
perspective, and perhaps unprecedented internationally for a previously craft-
based union system.  However, it has not instituted a system of industry-based
unionism, which was the original goal.  Some of the new unions are broadly
industry based, but many others are 'conglomerates' with a presence in many
industries.  The enduring legacy of craft unionism and factional differences
have been the primary reasons for this outcome.  The emerging pattern of
union structures has resulted in competition between unions within the same
industry (Lambert, 1991).
The way in which amalgamations have proceeded has therefore made a
full rationalisation of union coverage within industry very difficult.  As a result,
single bargaining units (SBUs) have assumed more importance.  The national
wage case decision in 1991 specified that an SBU was a prerequisite for
ratification of an enterprise agreement, a condition which was continued in the
1994 Industrial Relations Reform Act.
Despite the failure to achieve strict industrial unionism, it is nevertheless
possible to discern many positive features in the mergers.  Some newly
amalgamated unions are predominantly industry based.  Others provide the
possibility for workers to progress from the lowest skill and wage levels to the
highest while remaining in the same union, thereby removing a traditional
barrier to skill orientation among unions and unionists alike.  The larger unions
may also be able to provide better services to their membership, although this
is disputed by some observers who argue that the new unions are too big and
will exacerbate the alienation of ordinary workers from their unions (Costa and
Duffy, 1991).  The unions themselves are aware of this danger, and are striving
to improve their links with members at the workplace.
One of the biggest challenges facing the new unions is membership
decline.  Union density in Australia has fallen steadily for almost 20 years, from
around 50% in 1976 to 35% in 1994.  Only around a quarter of private sector
employees are unionised, compared to over 60% in the public sector (ABS,
Cat. No. 6325.0).28
The loss of union membership in the private sector is particularly worrying.
It has enabled business and conservative party leaders to argue that unions are
not representative of private sector workers, and that individual contracts and
enterprise bargaining without a guaranteed role for unions would better reflect
workers' own wishes, as revealed by their apparent unwillingness to join unions
(Howard, 1991).  Evidence to support this view comes from a recent survey
which showed that up to one fifth of union members covered by closed shops
would quit their membership if the closed shop was abolished - something
which is likely to occur under the new government (The Weekend Australia,
May 11-12, 1996, p. 10).  This would bring union density down to around 30%.
However, the same survey also showed that almost half the respondents (48%)
would join a union if they were totally free to do so - indicating that there are a
large pool of potential union members either unable to join or which unions
have yet to reach.
The initial response of the ACTU and the wider union movement to the
membership crisis was to hasten its structural reform process.  More recently,
emphasis has shifted to recruitment activity and new union services.  Around
one hundred new, mainly young and female union organisers have been
appointed, with a special focus on younger workers, women and lightly
unionised sectors.  Union services such as superannuation, legal and financial
advice have also increased.  But with Coalition governments at Federal level
and in most of the States planning to outlaw the closed shop, to cease
automatic 'check-offs' for union membership dues for government employees,
and to restrict the right of unions to enter a workplace and to collectively
bargain, the immediate prospects for a recovery in union membership, let alone
influence, look bleak.
This conclusion is reinforced when it is realised that in the absence of
national support in the form of the Accord, reversing membership decline and
continuing the 'strategic unionism' agenda will require active workplace
unionism - Australian trade unionism's Achilles' heel.  In 1989-90, only two
thirds of unionised workplaces had a union delegate or shop steward, a figure
which dropped to 56% in the private sector (Callus et al., 1991, p. 271).
Moreover, around a half of these delegates had been delegates for less than
two years, and a similar percentage spent less than one hour per week on
union business (pp. 277-79).  Only a quarter of workplaces with 20 or more
employees could be classified as having active unions, on a generous definition
(p. 151).  When combined with management structures, just 14% of workplaces
(representing 40% of employees) could be classified as 'active bargainers' (p.
157) - a virtual prerequisite for DQP and productivistic unionism.
The ACTU's push towards enterprise bargaining in the early 1990s could
therefore be interpreted at least partly as an effort to force unions to increase
their workplace resources in anticipation of conservative party victories at29
Federal and State elections.  But the deep recession which hit at this time threw
this strategy off-course.  While amalgamation may enhance union survival in
the face of recession, enterprise bargaining and the actions of anti-Labor
governments, it has yet to show that it is capable of reviving union membership
or influence in a way that will enable productivistic and skill-oriented strategies
to be sustained and delivered across the economy.  That remains the principal
challenge for the union movement over the coming years.
4. Assessment
There is little doubt that the Australian trade union movement's adoption of
'strategic unionism' has been genuine and is recognisably similar to the skill-
oriented, productivistic agenda which Streeck supports.  It has involved a
reorientation of priorities towards the supply side of the economy as a way of
promoting a high-skill, high-wage production system, coupled with the retention
and extension of social democratic, corporatist and egalitarian elements.
Each of the five institutional conditions for DQP has been tackled to some
extent.  Technological change at work is now, at least in principle, open to
union influence; employment protection has been increased; work organisation
and skill formation reform have become central to the industrial awards which
govern the industrial relations system; and the bulk of trade union members
have been reorganised into twenty large unions.  Many of the changes to
industrial relations and training have been initiated by the trade union
movement, led by the ACTU.
Moreover, the union agenda has been avowedly inclusive and egalitarian.
A centralised wage mechanism has been maintained (through the national
wage case) to prevent lower paid workers from slipping too far behind better
organised workers as industrial relations become more decentralised.  Training
reform has been built around national and industry standards, with an emphasis
on safeguarding the recognition and portability of skills. Skills formation has
been interpreted broadly, encompassing career paths for all workers, from
entry-level to the professions.  Access and equity issues, particularly the
training needs of women and minorities, have been emphasised.  And the
Accord itself has targeted social wage improvements on poorer non-wage and
wage earners in a solidaristic fashion.
Yet the strategies for realising each institutional condition for DQP have run
into problems, particularly in terms of implementation at enterprise level.  The
opportunities for substantial supply side change which unions have helped
facilitate have not been fully realised across the economy.  At best, progress30
has been patchy in terms of work reorganisation, training reform and industrial
democracy, while 'external rigidity' in the form of job security has hardly been
developed at all.  Many firms still rely on traditional and narrowly-based cost-
cutting production strategies.  Economic, productivity and real wage growth
have been average, unemployment remains high, social inequality has
increased and union membership has declined.  Conservative governments
have now been elected, at State and Federal level, intent on tackling the 'final
frontier' in neo-liberalism's deregulation agenda, namely the labour market and
industrial relations system.
Why has the final outcome been so disappointing, and where does it leave
a social democratic inspired strategy of skill-oriented unionism, both in Australia
and elsewhere?  Let us look first at factors peculiar to Australia, before turning
to more general issues.
Australia was undoubtedly an unlikely candidate to initiate and implement a
successful supply side strategy aimed at instigating DQP.  Managerial
prerogative had been enshrined in the arbitration system for decades, the
economy was dominated by the resources sector and by protected, branch-
plant enterprises with little interest in, or history of, innovation or internationally
competitive manufacturing.  Trade unions had historically been very weak at
workplace level, were craft based, and lacked financial and human resources.
Government was fragmented by federalism and by a lack of experience in
sustained or sophisticated intervention in the economy.
If anything, it was remarkable that the union movement was able to adopt a
skill-oriented reform strategy at all and pursue it with the degree of success that
it did.  In doing so, it was initially helped by a combination of factors which were
later neutralised or reversed, thereby obstructing the union agenda.  For
example, rapid economic growth in the late 1980s (in conjunction with
increased competition) eased the reform process, but the subsequent
recession reduced workers' and unions' incentive and ability to embrace reform,
particularly given the lack of meaningful job security.  Similarly, initial employer
divisions, which had helped put the ACTU in the driving seat over industrial
relations reform, were overcome by the early 1990s.  The employers'
deregulatory agenda gained ground thereafter, especially once recession set in
and a number of conservative State governments were elected.  Government
policy, which had initially established tripartite industry restructuring plans
(including elements of the skill-oriented agenda) in key sectors such as steel,
automobiles and heavy engineering, became increasingly captured by market
ideologists which ruled out the more interventionist parts of the trade union
policy blueprint as set out in Australia Reconstructed.
The ACTU itself made a number of strategic and tactical errors.  Its
conversion to enterprise bargaining in the early 1990s was ill-timed, given that31
the recession was just setting in.  The emphasis placed on award restructuring,
and in particular on training reform, while crucial for gaining initial momentum to
industry modernisation, allowed other aspects of industry policy to go
unattended.  Within the supply side strategy, the unions' inability to win support
for statutory guarantees of industrial democracy at the workplace, or for greatly
improved job security, left them at a severe disadvantage in negotiations with
employers over work organisation and training issues.
This last point raises the issue of where to begin the reform process.
Streeck, the ACTU and others have emphasised skills and training as prime
movers.  But the Australian experience suggests industrial democracy and job
security are just as, if not more, important.  Without an assured voice at the
enterprise level, it was difficult if not impossible for unions to prevent managers
from adopting a narrow training and work organisation agenda, while easy
access by employers to the external labour market (in the form of forced
redundancies) allowed them to increase productivity through simple job
shedding rather than internal reorganisation.  Mandated structures for industrial
democracy also provide unions with an institutional base within the workplace
which can give them influence beyond what their membership strength may
suggest.  Australian unions may regret not having established clearly defined
and legally protected avenues for workplace representation under the Accord,
now that the protection afforded to them by the award system is under threat.
What does the Australian experience suggest more generally about future
union strategy in the face of restructuring?  At least four possibilities present
themselves.
The first, corresponding broadly to an 'old left' position, is a defence of the
'Fordist' settlement of demand management and the welfare state at the macro
level, and of wages and conditions at the workplace. The policies of the French
communist-led union, the CGT, would perhaps be an example of such a
strategy.  In Australia, this perspective considers the Accord to have been 'a
disaster for the labour movement' which occurred because the ACTU was
'more concerned with taking over management's role and creating a globally
competitive "productive culture" than with protecting workers from the
development of a de facto deregulated labour market' (Frankel, 1993, p. 5).
Of course, the problem with the defensive strategy is that it has not proven
to be particularly successful in countries like Britain, France or the USA, where
union membership has fallen even faster than in Australia and where the wage
gains of some workers have been won at the expense of other workers in terms
of higher unemployment and even greater social inequities.  Increasingly, there
is no-one to bargain with at national level on the demand side (in terms of
incomes policies), while union intransigence on the supply side leaves the
restructuring agenda completely with management.  In Australia, the defensive32
position of relying on the award system to protect unions and workers is
increasingly unviable, while even strong unions in traditional industry
strongholds (such as mining) have found themselves outmanoeuvred by new
management approaches.
A second, related strategy, corresponding to elements in the 'new left',
suggests that unions should 'stick to "older" ... demands posed by the labour
movement (e.g. for social justice) and ... bring them into line with the demands
raised by new social movements'.  This could 'lead to alliances quite different
from that with an "enlightened" management.  [Unions] might, for example,
enter into an alliance with regional and communal citizens' movements'
(Mahnkopf, 1992, pp. 79-80).  Such a strategy has generated increasing
interest in the US, for example
7 and in some quarters in Australia.
While this strategy may have merits at the political level, it leaves unstated
what union strategies should be at the workplace, which is ultimately where
they derive their strength and legitimacy from, and where they are most
threatened.
A third strategy, associated with some right-wing unions, argues that unions
should become interest groups for particular sections of the workforce, rather
than remain part of a broader movement.  A well-known exponent of this
approach is the electricians' union in Britain.  It finds echoes in Australia
amongst some craft unionists and conservative process unions who have
signed enterprise deals with managements on greenfield sites.  While this
strategy may have a place for unions of skilled workers, 'unskilled' workers on
the periphery and their unions (if they exist at all) are marginal to its operation.
It resembles a form of enterprise unionism, which undercuts unions' egalitarian
and social justice aims.
This leaves us with skill-oriented unionism, with all its problems and
inadequacies as evidenced in the Australian example.  In view of the problems
of the other strategies, though, I believe it is too early to write off the skill-based
strategy just yet.  First, it is not yet clear to what extent conservative forces in
Australia will be able to roll back the progress made, as they face both political
and industrial opposition to their industrial relations agenda.
8  Second, real
gains were made under the Accord - particularly in skills formation and union
reorganisation - which many employers will want to retain and which provide a
basis for further advance in many industries and enterprises.  Furthermore,
past tactical errors and unfavourable external factors may in principle be
avoided in future.
                                                          
7 For a similar view in the US context, see Kessler-Harris and Silverman (1992).
8 The new Federal Coalition government does not have a majority in the Senate, and may
have to dilute its industrial relations legislation to secure its passage.33
Perhaps most importantly, however, is the need to recognise the limits of
the supply side strategy.  Even if the ACTU agenda had been executed
perfectly, it would not have been sufficient on its own to push Australian
industry towards a DQP strategy.  The significant differences in financial
systems and inter-corporate relationships which exist between the
uncoordinated liberal market economies in the English-speaking world, and the
business-coordinated market economies of Northern Europe and Japan, have
crucial effects on industry strategy which Streeck's model tends to overlook
(Soskice, 1996).  The direction of reform runs as strongly from economic and
industry policy to the enterprise as vice versa.  Supply side policy built around
workplace reform needs to be complemented by appropriate macroeconomic
policy, industry policy and financial reforms.
On the supply side itself, priority needs to be given to industrial democracy
in the first instance.  Left to itself, management in Australia – or elsewhere in
the English-speaking world at least – is unlikely to adopt a consensual,
participative style which involves unions or employees, especially in a
recession.  Instead, they are more likely to attempt 'quick fix' productivity gains
and wage trade-offs through concentrating on narrow forms of flexibility and
increased intensity of work.  Structures which ensure union and employee
rights to information and participation at the workplace, are essential in an era
of enterprise bargaining.  Entrenching and enhancing employee participation in
the enterprise would force unions to increase their workplace representative
structures; prevent management from too readily adopting a unilateralist, cost-
minimisation approach to work organisation reform; and help to prevent some
of the more important advances made by the union movement over the past
few years from being destroyed by the impending conservative onslaught.
Finally, it is clear that unions are not strong enough on their own to alter the
direction and form of management's production strategies.  The ACTU required
extensive assistance from the Federal Labor government through the Accord,
and from the Commission and its national wage principles, to secure the
reforms which it achieved.  Firms which had 'external' support from government
industry plans and other workplace reform programs generally adopted the
most comprehensive and progressive restructuring. The importance of
government was also demonstrated by what occurred in its absence.  A lack of
supportive macroeconomic policies and statutory support for workplace
industrial democracy meant that union efforts to force employers to adopt
innovative production strategies were severely weakened.
Therefore, for all its faults, the rapid return of a Labor government must
remain a priority for the union movement.  Otherwise, the 13 years of the
Accord will be seen as a mere interregnum in Australia's inevitable slide
towards Anglo-American neo-liberalism, rather than as a period which lay the
foundation stones for a distinctively antipodean social democracy.34
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